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Abstract 
This article provides methodological and empirical insights into the estimation of technical efficiency 
in the nursing home sector.  Focusing on long-stay care and using primary data, we examine technical 
and scale efficiency in 39 public and 73 private Irish nursing homes by applying an input-oriented 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). We employ robust bootstrap methods to validate our 
nonparametric DEA scores and to integrate the effects of potential determinants in estimating the 
efficiencies.  Both the homogenous and two-stage double bootstrap procedures are used to obtain 
confidence intervals for the bias-corrected DEA scores.  Importantly, the application of the double 
bootstrap approach affords true DEA technical efficiency scores after adjusting for the effects of 
ownership, size, case-mix, and other determinants such as location, and quality.  Based on our DEA 
results for variable returns to scale technology, the average technical efficiency score is 62%, and the 
mean scale efficiency is 88%, with nearly all units operating on the increasing returns to scale part of 
the production frontier.  Moreover, based on the double bootstrap results, Irish nursing homes are less 
technically efficient, and more scale efficient than the conventional DEA estimates suggest.  
Regarding the efficiency determinants, in terms of ownership, we find that private facilities are less 
efficient than the public units.  Furthermore, the size of the nursing home has a positive effect, and 
this reinforces our finding that Irish homes produce at increasing returns to scale.  Also, notably, we 
find that a tendency towards quality improvements can lead to poorer technical efficiency 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Defining, measuring and improving organizational efficiency in nursing home care provision 
is an important research area as nearly every developed country is faced with the prospect of 
a population that is getting older, and eventually smaller, given current population age 
structures, increasing life expectancy, and birth rates which are under the replacement rate.  
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The Irish case is of particular interest for a number of reasons.  First, Ireland’s population is 
ageing quickly, and it is the increase in the ‘oldest’ old that is going to be most dramatic.  The 
65+ and 85+ age cohorts are forecast to increase by 38% and 46% respectively in the years 
2011-2021 (BDO 2014: 22), and this growth is projected to accelerate into the future.  
Second, the mixed public-private nursing home care system in Ireland; and third, Irish policy-
makers have moved away from the traditional public provision of nursing home care in 
favour of incentivising private delivery.  As the costs of long-term care are expected to 
increase considerably as the population ages – a challenge shared by many countries – the 
estimation of technical efficiencies is essential in assessing whether nursing homes can utilise 
their resources more efficiently in order to reduce their costs of care.  In the context of the 
fiscal constraints facing the Irish exchequer, efficiency and ‘value for money’ are 
increasingly dominant considerations in relation to all areas of public spending, including 
health care.  Taxpayers, policymakers, regulators, and indeed, society as a whole, need 
corroboration that long-term health care services are being efficiently provided. 
Despite the importance of efficiency measurement in nursing home care provision, it is 
only recently that the more advanced parametric and mathematical programming frontier 
techniques have been applied to estimate not only efficiency scores, but also the effects of 
possible efficiency determinants in the long-term care sector.  Gertler and Waldman (1994) 
reported that for-profit homes were more efficient than non-profit units, but quality was 
higher in the latter.  Ozcan et al. (1998) used DEA to determine the technical efficiency of 
skilled nursing facilities in the United States and concluded that profit status homes had 
higher efficiencies than non-profits.  Anderson et al. (1999) employed parametric techniques 
and found that chain affiliation and not-for-profit homes reduced efficiency.  Björkgren et al. 
(2001) used DEA and reported inefficient resource allocation in nursing home units in 
Finland.  Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) also applied DEA and found that high fiscal capacity, 
a low degree of user-charge financing, and a fragmented local council are associated with low 
efficiency in the elderly care sector in Norway.  Other studies which used similar methods 
and data in the measurement of efficiency in long-term care provision are: Laine et al. 
(2005), Wang and Chou (2005), Knox et al. (2007), Farsi et al. (2008), Garavaglia et al. 
(2011), Chang and Cheng (2013), and DeLellis and Ozcan (2013).1 
The aim of this paper is to provide robust estimates of both technical and scale 
efficiency scores for the long-stay nursing home sector in Ireland.  Our analysis is input-
oriented and hence looks at the amount by which inputs can be proportionally reduced, with 
output fixed.  Here output is given by the number of total patient days.  We measure and 
appraise technical efficiency in both public and private (including voluntary) long-term care 
units using detailed primary data which were collected via face-to-face interviews for the 
years 2008-2009.  This study is the first attempt to evaluate the efficiency of nursing home 
services using Irish data. 
Moreover, we are concerned with the question of how ownership affects the technical 
efficiency of nursing homes in Ireland.  This is motivated by a number of considerations.  
First, as reasoned by Rosko et al. (1995), managers in both for-profit and non-profit nursing 
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home facilities may pursue self-enhancing objectives (excess staff, travel, slack time etc.) 
which may increase inputs and costs, and hence reduce efficiency.  Furthermore, the same 
authors maintain that, as posited by property rights theorists, the profit motive creates a 
strong incentive to monitor and restrain this type of behaviour, resulting in the more efficient 
operation of for-profit firms.  However, many previous studies have found significant but 
sometimes contradicting results with respect to the impact of ownership on efficiency in the 
long-term care sector.  Second, we contend that Ireland serves as an interesting laboratory in 
which the effects of ownership on efficiency performance can be investigated – the mixed 
public-private nursing home care system in Ireland is unusual.  In 2007, about 36% of all 
private and voluntary nursing homes received a fixed/block contract per bed to supply some 
of their beds capacity to the State, and our sample of non-public facilities is drawn only from 
these homes.  For these private-voluntary long-stay care units, which are compared with the 
public nursing homes in this study, payment is not based on bed use or occupancy.  This 
implies that all of the nursing homes examined in this research – both public and private – are 
in receipt of a quasi-subvention from the State to varying degrees, and are therefore 
cushioned from the imperative of minimising costs and producing efficiently.  Third, in the 
late 1990’s, Irish policy-makers began incentivising private nursing home care delivery 
through the provision of capital allowances.  Within a short period of time, the private 
sector’s share of total long-stay beds capacity doubled to 80%, and the question arises 
whether such a policy is justified from a productive efficiency point of view.  As a result, this 
study suggests some implications for policy-makers of supporting private facilities to develop 
the long-stay beds capacity required to meet current and future older person care needs. 
Besides ownership, we also take into account other potential determinants of efficiency 
such as case-mix, size, location, and quality.  The more complicated the case-mix status of 
elderly people, the more likely additional inputs are required which in turn decreases 
technical efficiency.  Quality is another important factor affecting efficiency in the nursing 
home sector.  However, it “is a multidimensional phenomenon, with no measure capable of 
accounting for all the many facets of quality provided in a nursing home” (Kleinsorge and 
Karney, 1992: 61). 
This study contributes to the efficiency literature by providing methodological and 
empirical insights into the estimation of technical efficiency in the nursing home sector.  
Regarding our method, using a primary data set for Irish nursing homes, we first apply an 
input-oriented DEA model to identify technical and scale inefficiencies in public and for-
profit facilities facing the same production frontier.  We compare the obtained mean technical 
and scale efficiency scores and also the distribution of these scores for both public and 
private (and voluntary) nursing homes.  Then, we employ both the homogenous bootstrap and 
two-stage double bootstrap DEA methods to obtain confidence intervals for the bias-
corrected DEA scores.  Crucially, the double bootstrap model integrates the effects of 
efficiency determinants as explanatory variables in estimating the true efficiencies.  Hence, 
the novel (in terms of nursing home applications) two-stage double bootstrap method affords 
estimates of the parameters of the efficiency determinants as well as bias-corrected DEA 
scores after controlling for the effects of efficiency factors.  To the best of our knowledge, 
only Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) have previously applied the double bootstrap method in 
evaluating technical efficiency in nursing homes. 
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The structure of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview of 
the nursing home market in Ireland and section 3 presents the theoretical background and 
relevant literature that underpins the evaluation of technical efficiency in the nursing home 
sector.  Section 4 discusses the DEA and bootstrap DEA methods employed, and section 5 
provides detail on our data set and the variables used. Section 6 presents our empirical 
findings, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Irish Nursing Home Sector 
Unlike other European Countries where more integrated models of older care services and 
supports exist, the model of care for elderly people remains underdeveloped in Ireland.  This 
is reflected in limited intermediate/ or step-down options.  As a result, significant demands 
continue to be placed on the nursing home sector to meet the care needs of the older 
population. 
Formally, there are three categories of nursing homes in the Republic of Ireland (RoI), 
namely: ‘for profit’, ‘not-for-profit’ and ‘public’ – or private, voluntary, and public units 
respectively.  In 2013, there were 307 private nursing homes, 50 voluntary (or not-for-profit) 
homes and 110 public long-stay institutions and facilities in Ireland.  Voluntary nursing 
homes include those homes run by charities and the homes run by religious orders for their 
older nuns and priests.  More generally, however, Irish nursing homes are classified into two 
groups: ‘public’ and ‘private and voluntary’ nursing home sectors.  Also, it should be 
emphasized that this study focuses on long-stay care, and does not include limited stay 
patients. 
Traditionally, public nursing homes were the dominant setting for long-term residential 
care in Ireland, but have now been replaced by privately owned and operated units. Between 
1998 and 2011, the government provided capital allowances in the nursing home care market 
to stimulate private supply.  It was argued that this new policy initiative would lead to greater 
efficiencies, effectiveness, and responsiveness to consumer needs than would have obtained 
through continued direct government provision of nursing home services.  Canniffe (1999) 
suggested that investments in private nursing homes became a legitimate way of reducing 
exposure to income tax for middle to high income tax-payers.  Resultantly, a secular trend 
has been the rapid increase in private sector beds provision as a proportion of total long-stay 
beds.  From Figure 1, the number of private beds doubled from 6,609 to 13,375 between 1998 
and 2011.  In 1998, the State provided 9,138 public beds – 48% of the country’s long-term 
care beds.  However, by 2001 the public sector was relegated to the role of secondary player 
in the nursing home care market.  In 2013, private and voluntary nursing homes provided 
80% of the overall long-stay beds capacity, with the remainder supplied by public units.  
According to the most recent Nursing Homes Ireland (NHI) data, private and voluntary 
homes have “collectively invested up to €2bn developing necessary capacity, undertaking 
infrastructural improvements and transforming nursing home care” (although they do not 
specify a time frame). 
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Figure 1 Mix of Public, Private and Voluntary Beds 1998-20132 
  
Data source: Annual Survey of Long Stay Units, Department of Health and Children. 
 
In Ireland, the State’s Nursing Home Support Scheme (NHSS)3 is the mechanism by 
which the cost of long-stay care for the majority of nursing home residents is funded.  The 
NHSS/ Fair Deal provides financial support for people who have been independently 
assessed as having a requirement for long-term residential care, and is founded on the core 
principles that long-term care should be affordable, and that a person should receive the same 
level of State support whether they choose a public or private nursing home.  Applicants 
approved for funding under the NHSS have their income and assets assessed to determine the 
contribution to be made by the applicant to the cost of their long-term residential care and, 
consequently, the level of State support, if any.  A key feature of the scheme is resident 
choice.  Once an applicant has been approved for the scheme, they are free to choose any 
public or registered private nursing home covered under the scheme, entering into a contract 
for care with their chosen home. 
The Irish population is ageing, and is doing so relatively quickly.  According to 
‘Population and Labour Force Projections 2016-2046’ (CSO, 2013), the number of people 
aged 65 and over in Ireland will increase by 167%, from 532,000 in 2011 to over 1.4 million 
by 2046.  Clearly, the Irish nursing home sector will need to increase its current capacity of 
21,175 long-stay beds very considerably to meet this projected demand.  More significantly, 
the cohort requiring the highest level of care, aged 85 and over, is growing more rapidly, and 
this growth is forecast to accelerate into the future.  The Irish population aged 85+ is 
expected to jump dramatically from 58,200 to 266,900 in the period 2011-2046 – an increase 
of 359%.  This projected surge in demand is going to present severe challenges for the supply 
of Irish nursing home care services, and achieving greater effectiveness and efficiencies in 
resource use will become increasingly dominant considerations. 
Table 1 compares public expenditure on long-term care (LTC) as a percentage of GDP, 
and by type of care, for selected EU countries in 2010.  Ireland spends 1.1% of its GDP on 
LTC provision, and only 17% of this public expenditure is allocated to the informal 
                                                          
2 The national response rate for 1999 was very low – most likely, due to the restructuring of the Eastern Health 
Board.  Hence, data for this year are not included here. 
3 The NHSS has been in existence since 1993. It had been known previously as the Nursing Home Subvention 
Scheme before it was transformed, and re-launched as the Nursing Home Support Scheme – “A Fair Deal” in 
October 2009. 
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environment – home-care packages to support the elderly person to reside in their own home 
– with the balance spent on formal or residential facilities (i.e. nursing homes).  In contrast, 
Sweden invests more of its GDP on long-term care provision than any other EU country, with 
roughly half of this funding allocated to informal care.  It is important to note also that, in 
2009, Sweden had 7.5% of its population aged 65+ in formal LTC – compared to 4.5% in 
Ireland and 3.4% in Germany (BDO, 2014: 3).  However, given the projected increases in its 
elderly population, it is likely that Ireland will be spending appreciably more on long-term 
care provision.  At an operational level, the direct cost of the NHSS to the Irish exchequer 
was estimated to be in the region of €975m in 2014.  However, the annual cost of funding this 
scheme is expected to exceed €1.2bn by 2021, and €2bn by 2041.  This is based on future 
population projections, current values and before inflation (BDO, 2014: iii).  Thus, with 
limited public resources, achieving greater efficiencies will be paramount in order to meet 
future demand for nursing home care services. 
Table 1 Comparative Public Expenditure on LTC as a % of GDP and 
by Type of Care (2010). 
Country 
Public Expenditure on 
LTC as % of GDP 
Informal (%) 
Formal or 
Residential (%) 
Sweden 3.8 52 48 
Netherlands 3.8 48 52 
Portugal 0.3 76 24 
Czech Republic 0.8 74 26 
Ireland 1.1 17 83 
Lithuania 1.2 59 41 
Germany 1.4 61 39 
EU – 27 1.8 58 42 
Data source: DG ECFIN (2012). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
We focus on the measurement of technical efficiency (TE) as opposed to economic or cost 
efficiency owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on the costs of inputs for 
nursing homes in Ireland.  As the output of the nursing homes in our study is defined as total 
patient days, we choose an input-oriented approach to measuring technical efficiency in order 
to assess if, and by how much, capital and, in particular, labour inputs can be reduced while 
achieving the same level of output.  Input-oriented TE has also been more widely used, 
relative to the other efficiency measures, in empirical studies on the nursing home sector (e.g. 
Nyman and Bricker 1989; Nyman et al. 1990; Fizel and Nunnikhoven 1992; Chattopadhyay 
and Heffley 1994; Kooreman 1994; Ozcan et al. 1998; Bjorkgren et al. 2001; Laine et al. 
2005; Wang and Chou 2005; Borge and Haraldsvik 2009; Garavaglia et al. 2011; Chang and 
Cheng 2013; DeLellis and Ozcan 2013).4  Table A1 presents an overview of the studies 
which applied different techniques for estimating efficiency in the nursing home sector in 
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various countries.  It is evident that technical efficiency (as opposed to allocative efficiency) 
is the most common measure used here. 
Additionally, we measure scale efficiency (SE) as it is possible that the nursing homes 
are technically efficient but the scale of operations may not be optimal.  The constant returns 
to scale (CRS) assumption is only appropriate when all nursing homes are operating at 
optimal scale.  When the technology allows variable returns to scale (VRS) along the frontier, 
scale efficiency is achieved only at the point where the average productivity of the observed 
input-mix attains a maximum.  The point of maximum average productivity on the VRS 
frontier corresponds to CRS.  When, for example, an individual nursing home unit operates 
under diminishing returns to scale, it would need to reduce the scale of its operations (both its 
input and output bundles) in order to attain both technical and scale efficiency. 
According to Farsi et al. (2008), Chattopadhyay and Ray (1996) and Worthington 
(2004), the literature on measuring efficiency in the nursing home industry dates back to the 
1980s, and in the earlier econometric studies, the estimated relation reflected an average 
(based on best-fit) rather than an efficient or frontier cost function.  Thus, inefficiencies were 
confounded with pure random shocks.  For this reason, in the last two decades, the literature 
on the nursing home sector has moved towards a more appropriate approach to the 
measurement of efficiency.  This can be achieved by applying a linear programming frontier 
technique such as DEA.  The approach was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), based on the 
pioneering work of Farrell (1957), when they proposed an input orientation with CRS.  DEA 
constructs a nonparametric piecewise-linear convex frontier using sample data where nursing 
home units which use the fewest inputs in producing a given level of output are identified.  A 
nursing home is considered to be technically efficient, with regard to its inputs usage, if it lies 
on the frontier (isoquant).  DEA is the dominant approach to efficiency measurement in 
healthcare (Hollingsworth 2003, 2008).  In relation to nursing homes, DEA was used to 
estimate technical efficiencies in the USA by Nyman and Bricker (1989), Nyman et al. 
(1990), Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), Kleinsorge and Karney (1992), Chattopadhyay and 
Heffley (1994), Chattopadhyay and Ray (1996), Ozcan et al. (1998), and DeLellis and Ozcan 
(2013); and by Kooreman (1994) for the Netherlands; Bjorkgren et al. (2001), and Laine et 
al. (2005) for Finland; Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) for Norway; Garavaglia et al. (2011) for 
Italy; and Wang and Chou (2005) and Chang and Cheng (2013) for Taiwan. 
Other nursing home studies have employed the econometric stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) approach, originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), to the parametric estimation of 
the efficient cost function using data on input prices (e.g. Hoffler and Rungeling, 1994; 
Vitaliano and Toren, 1994; Anderson et al., 1999; Crivelli et al. 2002; Knox et al., 2007; and 
Farsi et al., 2008).  This frontier is usually estimated using a maximum likelihood method 
which assumes that any deviation from the technology (frontier) is composed of two parts, 
one representing randomness (or statistical noise) and the other inefficiency. 
In this study, to estimate input-oriented TE, we apply the DEA method as, in contrast to 
SFA, it does not impose a specific functional form on the production technology of the 
nursing home sector.  It also allows for analysis of the productivity of nursing home units 
which is composed of both technical efficiency and scale efficiency (Banker et al. 1984).  In 
order to identify the nature of the scale inefficiencies, we employ the non-increasing returns 
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to scale extension of the VRS DEA model.  As referred to above, DEA is the most widely 
applied method to evaluate technical efficiency in the nursing home sector. 
The main criticism of the conventional DEA method is that it implicitly assumes that 
all of the distance between an observed firm and the optimal isoquant for the efficient firms 
reflects inefficiency.  However, the distance of an observation from the efficient boundary 
reflects both inefficiency and noise.  This is because the observed input-output data could be 
subject to measurement error, or there could be noise in the data due to omitted input or 
output variables.  The homogenous bootstrap method provides an attractive alternative to the 
conventional DEA approach.  Its use in nonparametric envelopment estimators was 
developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000).  We use this technique to correct for any bias 
in our conventional DEA efficiency scores and to estimate confidence intervals for them, 
recognising that our data are subject to random error.  In the nursing homes efficiency 
literature, only Garavaglia et al. (2011) have previously implemented the homogenous 
bootstrap procedure. 
Furthermore, a number of previous DEA studies have employed a two-stage approach 
wherein nonparametric DEA efficiency estimates from the first stage are regressed on a 
vector of efficiency determinants in a parametric analysis in the second stage.  These papers 
typically use either ordinary least squares (OLS), Tobit or logistic regression techniques in 
the second stage, and rely on conventional methods for inference.  However, Simar and 
Wilson (2007, 2011) assert that whatever the second-stage regression technique employed, 
conventional inference methods fail to give valid inference due to the fact that in the second-
stage, true efficiency remains unobserved and must be replaced with DEA estimates of 
efficiency, and these are serially correlated by construction, and are also biased.5 
Previous two-stage DEA nursing home efficiency studies include Nyman et al. (1990), 
Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), Kooreman (1994), Ozcan et al. (1998), Wang and Chou 
(2005), and Garavaglia et al. (2011).  In these models, the determining factors posited are 
drawn from the following set of variables: ownership, case-mix (e.g. % of 
Medicare/Medicaid patients, % of patients aged 85+, average length of stay), quality, 
occupancy rate, size, urban/rural location or region, and the Herfindahl index of market 
concentration or the number of homes in the vicinity (to measure competitive pressures). 
Similarly, this article also examines how the ownership of the nursing home, size, case-
mix, and other determinants such as location, and quality affect the technical efficiency 
scores.  However, to investigate the effects of these variables, we apply the double bootstrap 
procedure developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) in the second stage, which not only enables 
robust estimation of the parameters of efficiency determinants, but also re-estimates the 
efficiency scores to take account of these determining variables.  To our knowledge, only 
Borge and Haraldsvik (2009), who examine the impact of three key determinants of 
efficiency in public homes in Norway, and the recent study by Iparraguirre and Ma (2015), 
which investigates efficiency in the provision of social care for older people in England, have 
previously applied this technique in evaluating efficiency in the elderly care sector. 
                                                          
5 The efficiency score is a point estimate without a probability distribution around it as required by the Tobit 
method or any other parametric regression technique.  Using the DEA point estimates in a second stage analysis 
may cause biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the explanatory/ determining variables. 
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4. Estimation Method 
4.1 DEA model for nursing homes 
We first apply the input-oriented constant returns to scale (CRS) DEA method to obtain the 
technical efficiency (TE) scores for each nursing home i by solving the following linear 
programming problem: 
   Min θ, λ 𝜃 
   Subject to: –  𝑞i +  𝑄𝜆 ≥  0 
𝜃𝑥i –  𝑋𝜆 ≥  0 
𝜆 ≥  0 
Where: 𝜃 is the TE score for the i-th nursing home unit; 𝜆 is a 𝐼 × 1 vector of constants; 𝑞i 
denotes the output of the i-th unit; 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of inputs of the i-th unit; 𝑄𝜆 and 𝑋𝜆 denote a 
projected point due to radial contraction of the input vector 𝑥𝑖.  The objective is to try to find 
the minimum θ that reduces the input vector 𝑥𝑖 to θ𝑥𝑖 while guaranteeing at least the output 
level 𝑞𝑖.  Therefore, the value of 𝜃 will range between 0 and 1, with a score of 1 implying a 
point on the frontier where the nursing home is technically efficient. 
To account for variable returns to scale (VRS), the CRS linear programming problem is 
extended by adding the convexity constraint 𝐼1’𝜆 = 1 proposed by Banker et al. (1984).  This 
constraint ensures that an inefficient nursing home is only ‘benchmarked’ against units of a 
similar size.  To obtain the scale inefficiency, the CRS TE scores are divided by the VRS TE 
scores, and any difference in measured technical efficiency can be attributed to the presence 
of scale inefficiency.  In order to obtain the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) TE scores, 
the constraint proposed by Färe et al. (1983, 1985) can be added, by substituting the 𝐼1’𝜆 = 1 
in the VRS DEA model with 𝐼1’𝜆 ≤ 1.  When the NIRS and CRS measures are equal to one 
another but differ from the VRS measure, increasing returns to scale holds at the 
corresponding efficient projection on the VRS frontier.  On the other hand, if the VRS and 
NIRS measures are equal but differ from the CRS measure, diminishing returns to scale holds 
at the relevant point on the VRS frontier.  The three measures coincide only at an MPSS 
(most productive scale size).  Note that the CRS and NIRS frontiers are mere artefacts that 
permit us to examine different points on the VRS frontier. 
 
4.2 Bootstrapping 
We apply both the homogenous and the two-stage double (semi-parametric) bootstrap 
methods to first, address the main drawback of the conventional DEA approach – that it does 
not account for random errors.  Hence, the bootstrap techniques are employed to examine the 
robustness of our estimated conventional DEA technical efficiency scores.  Second, we apply 
the double bootstrap procedure to investigate the impact of ownership on technical efficiency, 
together with other posited determinants.  In this method, the bias-corrected efficiency scores 
incorporate the effects of the determining variables. 
Following Garavaglia et al. (2011), we use the procedure for homogenous 
bootstrapping in non-parametric frontier models developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 
2000) to validate our efficiency estimates.  By sampling repeatedly from the obtained CRS 
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and VRS DEA efficiency scores described in section 4.1, we construct an empirical sampling 
distribution for the DEA TE efficiencies of the nursing home units.  The bias in the DEA 
efficiencies can then be estimated and 95% confidence intervals can be built using this 
empirical distribution.6 
To obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters of our posited determining variables, 
and additionally to get bias-corrected bootstrap DEA TE scores, we adopt Algorithm 2 of the 
double bootstrapping method set out by Simar and Wilson (2007).  To begin, a truncated 
regression model is estimated using our conventional DEA TE scores from section 4.1 as the 
dependent variable, and the efficiency determinants as explanatory variables.  Next, the 
bootstrap is applied to correct first for the bias problem in the original DEA scores.  
Empirical sampling distributions are obtained by taking L1=100 drawings of residuals from a 
truncated normal distribution. The truncated regression model is re-estimated for each 
drawing to give bias-corrected efficiency scores.  Then, the DEA TE scores are re-calculated 
(performing L1 additional DEA analyses – one for each drawing) after adjusting the input 
values for the ratio of original DEA TE estimates to the bias-corrected DEA TE scores.  The 
second objective is to correct for the serial correlation problem.  The truncated regression 
model is re-run – this time with the bias-corrected technical efficiency scores as the 
dependent variable.  Similar to before, L=2,000 drawings of residuals are taken from a 
truncated normal distribution.  After re-estimating the truncated regression model for each 
drawing, we obtain a set of estimates for the parameters of the determining variables and 
construct confidence intervals. 
 
5. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Data set 
In this study, we use primary data collected for nursing homes in Ireland between 2008 and 
2009 and some detail regarding our sample is presented in Table 2.  We focus on public 
homes as well as the private and voluntary units that provide long-stay care only and are 
contracted by the State in Ireland.  All nursing homes examined are either funded fully or to 
some significant degree by the exchequer.  In order to identify the private and voluntary long-
stay units that the State purchases care from, a parliamentary question (29365/07) was 
submitted in 2007.  The reply specified the name of each nursing home and the number of 
contract beds which the unit supplied.  The population of Irish nursing homes with public and 
State contracted beds divided into 125 public, 151 private and 6 voluntary units.  
Furthermore, we filtered the population of 157 private and voluntary nursing homes by 
imposing a threshold criterion whereby 10% or more of a unit’s total beds provision had to be 
State-contracted for inclusion in our sample.  From Figure 2, the share of contract beds is 
below 50% for the vast majority of private and voluntary nursing homes in this research – the 
average share is 27%.  Hence, these units are rather more private/ profit-orientated, and we 
expect that their efficiency levels could differ significantly compared to the public nursing 
homes which are fully subsidised by the State. 
 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that the method developed by Simar and Wilson (2000) is relatively robust with regard to 
the chosen bandwidth of the confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2  Distribution of Irish private-voluntary nursing homes in relation to 
% of State-contracted beds 
 
Data source: Primary data collected via face-to-face interviews, 2008-2009. 
 
After permission to undertake this research was approved at Assistant Director of Nursing 
level, Local Health Managers (LHM) were then contacted to discuss nursing home access.  
The LHM’s stipulated that 51 named public homes could not be approached due to privacy 
considerations related to the “medico-social status of the residents.”  Accordingly, the 
‘effective’ population reduced to 74 public and 106 private and voluntary units.  All 180 
nursing homes were contacted, and 59 public, 90 private, and 3 voluntary units agreed to 
partake in this research – thus, comprising our sample.  Cross-sectional data were then 
collated during July 2008–September 2009 via face-to-face interviews.  Relative to the 
effective population, a very high response rate was achieved – 59 out of 74 (80%) public 
nursing homes, and 93 out of 106 (88%) private and voluntary units. 
 
Table 2 Data collection and data sample 
Population/ sample Public nursing homes 
Private and voluntary nursing 
homes with contract beds 
Overall population 125 157 
Effective population 74 106 
Sample 59 93 
Response rate 80% 88% 
 
5.2 Output and input variables 
Output 
The definition and measurement of output is an enduring topic in the health economics 
literature.  It should be noted, however, that the conceptual output – improved health status, 
or even more generally, improved quality of life – is difficult to measure (Kooreman, 1994).  
Furthermore, the concept of ‘value-added’ as a result of engaging with the ‘service’ has 
proved more challenging in health care, because of the much greater heterogeneity of service 
users and the intrinsic measurement difficulties.  A fundamental issue is that it is rarely 
possible to observe a baseline – for example, the health or quality of life status that would 
have obtained in the absence of nursing home intervention. 
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One solution to this challenge is to measure output on a “quantifiable basis” 
(Hollingsworth, 2003).  Similarly, the nursing home literature reflects the use of quantifiable 
indicators of output – Delellis and Ozcan (2013) observe that the number of patient days in a 
home or the number of residents are the predominant measures used.  In this research, we 
define the output of a nursing home unit as total patient days.  This measure has been applied 
in other nursing home efficiency studies – including, Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), 
Chattopadhay and Heffley (1994), Chattopadhay and Ray (1996), Bjorkgren et al. (2001), 
and Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) for DEA; and Hoffler and Rungeling (1994) using the SFA 
method.  Furthermore, while we do not adjust total patient days for case-mix at this stage of 
the analysis, case-mix is incorporated as an efficiency determinant in the double bootstrap 
estimations (see Section 5.3 below) similar to the approach adopted by Borge and Haraldsvik 
(2009). 
Capital input 
Capital in the nursing home sector is difficult to measure as it is a durable input.  Unlike 
labour inputs, which are utilised in the production process within a specific accounting 
period, capital assets are purchased in one period and used in the production process 
throughout the life of the asset or until it is replaced by a new asset.  In principle, an 
efficiency model should use the capital flow consumed in the current period as a production 
input.  However, as information on capital flow is difficult to obtain in the nursing home 
sector (and also in other health care sectors), we approximate the capital input by using the 
number of beds available in the nursing home unit. 
This measure has been employed in other nursing home efficiency studies – including, 
Ozcan et al. (1998), Bjorkgren et al., (2001), Laine et al. (2005), Wang and Chou (2005), and 
Delellis and Ozcan (2013).  Moreover, data for the nursing home sector in Ireland have 
shown that managers are able to significantly increase or decrease beds capacity over 
consecutive years.  In section 2, we highlighted how the Irish Government, between 1998 and 
2011, provided capital allowances in the nursing home care market to stimulate private 
supply.  It is no coincidence that this period witnessed a trend in the rapid rise in private 
sector beds provision as a proportion of total long-stay beds (see Figure 1). Also, the private 
and voluntary nursing home units in Ireland with State-contracted beds have an incentive to 
increase their capital investment in order to receive higher public funding.  Therefore, we 
posit that including the number of beds in our production model as a proxy capital input is 
very important in the Irish case. 
Labour inputs 
We measure labour inputs by the number of staff employed in each nursing home unit, using 
both primary and secondary inputs – medical staff and non-medical staff, respectively.  The 
former being measured by the number of full-time nurses, while the latter is measured by the 
number of full-time health care attendants.7  Among the efficiency studies which have used 
medical staff (full-time equivalents) as an input in their DEA models are Nyman et al. 
                                                          
7 In order to test the sensitivity of our results in relation to the labour measures used, we substitute for the 
number of staff with the salaries of full-time nurses and the salaries of health care attendants for the primary and 
secondary inputs respectively.  Here, our findings are robust across the number of staff employed and salaries 
variables.  Results for the latter are available on request. 
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(1990), Ozcan et al. (1998), Bjorkgren et al. (2001), Laine et al. (2005), and Delellis and 
Ozcan (2013).  Nurses have a formal qualification in clinical care delivery, sometimes to 
postgraduate level.  In addition, their pivotal role is given legal standing in Ireland’s Health 
Act 2007, which compels a nursing home to have a nurse on the premises at all times.  The 
literature suggests that nurses can affect patient outcomes, thus highlighting their contribution 
in the care delivery process (Aaronson et al., 1994; Blegen et al., 1998; Harrington et al., 
2000).  Nurses are supported in the care delivery process by health care attendants who 
undertake non-clinical duties.  The non-medical personnel have a significant impact on the 
daily care of the patients, including the quality of care provision. 
The inclusion of both primary and secondary labour measures allows us to assess their 
relative importance in the efficiency of nursing home care provision in Ireland.  Therefore, 
depending on how the labour input is defined, we employ three alternative model 
specifications.  In Model 1, labour is measured solely by the number of medical staff in the 
nursing home unit.  Alternatively, in Model 2, labour is measured by the number of non-
medical staff only, whereas Model 3 includes both medical and non-medical staff variables.  
In each of the model specifications, capital is proxied by the number of beds, and output is 
defined as total patient days.  Table 3 summarises the three model specifications. 
 
Table 3 Model Specifications 
Input / Output Variable Description Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Output Total patient days yes yes yes 
Labour (Primary Input) Medical staff yes no yes 
Labour (Secondary Input) Non-medical staff no yes yes 
Capital Input Number of beds yes yes yes 
 
5.3 Efficiency determinants 
Ownership 
As discussed earlier, the ownership status of Irish nursing homes is an important efficiency 
determinant in the context of examining the implications of government policy in Ireland 
which sought to increase the number of private relative to public nursing home beds between 
1998 and 2011.  While all of the private facilities in our sample supply at least 10% of their 
total beds capacity to the State on a fixed/block contract basis, the average share of contract 
beds is below 30% and hence these private units can be considered mostly profit-orientated.  
Thus, there is a likely to be a real dichotomy in the motivations of public and private nursing 
homes in this study.  However, the effective State subsidy for the provision of contract beds 
implies that the private Irish nursing homes in our sample might be cushioned to varying 
degrees from the imperative of minimising costs and producing efficiently. 
 ‘Ownership’ is measured as a dummy variable, with a value of 1 assigned to private 
nursing home facilities.  In relation to nursing homes in the USA, Nyman and Bricker (1989), 
Nyman et al. (1990), Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), Chattopadhyay and Heffley (1994), and 
Ozcan et al. (1998) find for-profit homes to be more technically efficient than non-profit 
units.  From Nyman et al. (1990), non-profit nursing homes use about 6% more inputs per 
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patient than for-profit facilities, and in Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), for-profit nursing 
homes have higher mean levels of efficiency and a more efficient production frontier than 
non-profit homes.  Additionally, Ozcan et al. (1998: 221) observe that “consistent with much 
of the previous literature, this study found for-profit facilities to be more efficient than 
nonprofits, when allowed to face the same frontier.  However it is generally accepted that 
these groups face different technological use and goal orientations.”  In Europe, the majority 
of long-term care beds are provided by the non-competitive public sector.  Thus, the question 
of whether ownership status affects the efficiency of the nursing home is not widely 
considered.  Nonetheless, similar to the US, Garavaglia et al. (2011), in an Italian study 
which focuses specifically on the Lombardy region, find public institutions to be less efficient 
than private facilities – but their results suggest that this gap is closing.  However, Crivelli et 
al. (2002) find that public nursing homes in Switzerland are just as cost efficient as private 
units.  Wang and Chou (2005) report a similar finding for the technical efficiency of nursing 
homes in Taiwan. 
Location 
Additionally, we investigate ‘location’ as a possible determinant of technical efficiency.  
Here, a value of 1 is given if the nursing home is located inside the Dublin (capital city) area, 
and zero otherwise.  A priori, we might expect that nursing homes located in Dublin are more 
technically efficient than nursing homes in other areas.  Due to greater competition for 
medical and non-medical staff relative to other regions in Ireland, labour costs are higher in 
Dublin.  Consequently, as wage rates increase, nursing home managers react by using their 
labour inputs more efficiently (Zinn, 1993; Rosko et al., 1995).8  Furthermore, as Dublin 
represents a special case compared to other regions and cities in Ireland, it is important to 
account for this – almost 40 % of all nursing homes in our sample are located in the Dublin 
area (see Table 5 below).  This is our predominant choice of location indicator.  Additionally, 
an urban/ rural dummy variable was not included in the analysis due to the presence of 
collinearity.  In Nyman and Bricker (1989: 589), a variable representing whether the firm is 
located in an urban area was used to control for any effects of intensity of competition among 
rival firms on the efficiency score.  They had no expectations regarding the sign of this 
variable’s coefficient, but found that efficiency decreases in for-profit homes only, located in 
an urban area.  Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992: 433) include an urban/ rural dummy to capture 
the effect of concealed factors, including possibly the quality of labour, while Chattopadhyay 
and Heffley (1994) use dummy variables to represent counties with low population densities 
and percentages of the population living in urban areas compared to other counties, to control 
for “market characteristics.”  Ozcan et al. (1998: 217) include a regional location variable to 
account for regulatory and environmental characteristics that may influence a nursing home’s 
efficiency.  No significant location effect is found in these studies. 
 
 
                                                          
8 In many industries, firms respond to increases in wage rates by substituting more capital for labour.  However, 
this is difficult to achieve in the labour intensive nursing home industry.  Thus, the effect of higher input prices 
points to fewer labour inputs being demanded. 
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Size 
The environmental variable ‘size’ was considered as an important determinant of efficiency 
by Nyman et al. (1990), Chattopadhyay and Ray (1996), Filippini (1999), and Wang and 
Chou (2005).  In this research, we also consider the effect of size on technical efficiency, 
where the size of the nursing home is approximated using the number of beds.  The majority 
of nursing homes in our sample of Irish long-stay units have less than 100 beds at their 
disposal, and the mean is centred around 50 beds.  Hence, we divide our sample into 3 size 
categories as follows: size_1’ (0-49 beds), ‘size_2’ (50-99 beds) and ‘size_3’ (100 beds and 
over).  Thus, we include two ‘size’ dummy variables where ‘size_1’ is the reference category. 
We argue that if Irish nursing homes are scale-inefficient, then size must have a 
positive effect on overall technical efficiency when measured using CRS technology.  Also, it 
should be noted that the concept of scale inefficiency (i.e. IRS or DRS) is also closely related 
to the concept of economies or diseconomies of scale.  According to Ozcan et al. (1998: 214), 
where economies of scale occur, larger nursing home units facing decreasing average costs 
over the relevant range of outputs should experience efficiency advantages.  Efficiencies due 
to economies of scale can result from specialization of labour.  Beyond a threshold, 
diseconomies may arise due to managerial inefficiency.  Therefore, if economies of scale 
exist, a strong economic case could be made for the consolidation of small nursing homes 
into larger ones (Filippini, 1999).  As most of our sample of Irish nursing homes are small 
(almost 90% of all units have less than 100 beds), there is reason to believe that many 
facilities are operating in the range of increasing returns to scale, and hence are experiencing 
decreasing average costs – indicating the importance of increasing their size.  Nyman et al. 
(1990) found that size had a positive impact on efficiency up to a threshold of 170 beds.  
Also, Wang and Chou (2005) categorize size by the number of beds provided, as follows: 
Small <100, medium 100-499, and large >500.  However, they find a significant negative 
relationship – larger nursing homes are less technically efficient. 
Quality 
‘Quality’ is another potentially important determinant of technical efficiency in the provision 
of nursing home care (e.g. see Laine et al., 2005; Delellis and Ozcan, 2013).  In this research, 
we use the qualifications of the medical staff at the facility level as a proxy for ‘quality’ – a 
value of 1 is ascribed if the nursing home employs at least one nurse who has a diploma in 
gerontology or a postgraduate qualification in elderly care, and zero otherwise.  Given that 
the average number of medical staff across all the nursing homes with less than 100 beds in 
our sample (99 nursing homes out of 111) is 9 nurses, we posit that the employment of at 
least one nurse with a formal specialization in the care of the elderly might significantly 
improve the quality of care, if not necessarily productive efficiency.  The use of nurses with 
more advanced expertise in the caring process enhances the quality experience for the elderly 
person, and could lead to improved work practices, resulting in better efficiencies in the 
nursing home.  However, the link between increased quality and higher efficiency is 
ambiguous.  Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992: 433) observe that “because increased quality is 
likely to require additional input units per unit of output, homes providing higher quality of 
care may have lower efficiency scores.”  Increasing quality may require additional labour and 
capital resources, whilst a tendency towards efficiency improvements and cost containment 
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can lead to a poorer performance in quality. On the other hand, better quality can be 
associated with better economic performance and lower production costs, i.e. better 
efficiency. 
Most previous studies have restricted quality measures to include pressure sores or 
ulcers, catheters, and use of restraints (e.g. Rosko et al., 1995), and to deficiencies or 
inspection scores (e.g. Nyman and Bricker, 1989; and Fizel and Nunnikhoven, 1993).  
However, the quality variables used by Kooreman (1994) include the presence of a patients’ 
council, the presence a council of patients’ relatives, and the presence of a procedure for 
handling complaints.  Laine et al. (2005) analyse the association between quality of care and 
technical efficiency in long-term care in Finland.  They consider 41 quality variables 
separately, involving 38 clinical quality of care indicators, implying adverse care processes 
and outcomes (e.g. prevalence of falls, %; incidence of new pressure ulcers, %), and 3 
structural quality measures (proportion of registered nurses, %; proportion of rooms with own 
toilet, %; proportion of single rooms, %).  In relation to the structural quality variables, they 
found that the lower the proportion of registered nurses and the proportion of single rooms, 
the better the efficiency; whereas wards operated more efficiently when they had a higher 
number of rooms with en-suite toilets.  Similarly, the quality indicators used by Delellis and 
Ozcan (2013) were primarily clinical in nature (e.g. physical restraints, the percentage of 
bedridden residents, unplanned weight change).  However, only one of the analysed quality 
indicators (bladder incontinence) was lower in efficient nursing homes.  Hence, this study 
provides evidence that higher efficiency in nursing homes does not necessarily have to be 
attained by sacrificing quality. 
Case-mix 
Similar to Nyman et al. (1990) and Kooreman (1994), we measure case-mix for the 
‘percentage of patients aged 85 and over’.  The more complicated the case-mix status of 
elderly people, the more likely more inputs are required, which could lead to lower efficiency 
performances (Nyman and Bricker, 1989; Nyman et al., 1990; Chattopadhyay and Heffley, 
1994; Ozcan et al., 1998).  “The percentage of the population above 84 years in age is 
thought to be negatively related to efficiency due to a higher severity of illness” (Ozcan et al., 
1998: 217).  Kooreman (1994) also uses an index of the average length of stay to represent 
case-mix, while 10 indicators in all are employed by Nyman et al. (1990) – other variables 
include measures of ADLs,9 turnover of patients, the % of patients with decubiti; and the % 
of patients who are confused.  In other nursing home studies, Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992) 
apply the % of skilled beds as an indicator of case-mix, while Garavaglia et al. (2011) use the 
% of patients who are in low severity classes.  Nyman et al. (1990) and Kooreman (1994) 
found a negative case-mix effect on productive efficiency – as case-mix increases, efficiency 
scores fall.  A novel feature of this study is the inclusion of a case-mix indicator directly in 
the double-bootstrap setting – hence, the bias-corrected efficiency scores incorporate the 
effect of the case-mix variable, if any. 
Another approach to modelling the effects of case-mix is also to include the patient 
characteristics (for patients at different nursing home units) as a type of input in the 
                                                          
9 Activities of daily living (ADLs). 
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production frontier.  However, this approach may be inconsistent with economic theory, as 
patients are not inputs which are transformed to make the final product (total patient days).  
Instead, patients or residents consume care to (hopefully) produce improvements in their 
quality of life.  The characteristics of residents will influence the production of nursing home 
care in order to produce these improvements, hence resident characteristics may be better 
viewed as factors which shape the environment within which the production of nursing home 
care occurs, rather than inputs in the production process (see Hollingsworth and Peacock, 
2008: 35-36).  If resident characteristics are included as inputs in the DEA model, DEA 
would show the unit with the lowest value for a given case-mix variable to be efficient, and 
use this value as a reference point for assessing the efficiency of other providers.  Clearly, 
deeming a unit to be efficient in such a case is undesirable.  Hence, in this study, we use the 
case-mix variable as an efficiency determinant. 
 
5.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the output and input variables for all nursing homes, 
but also for public and private-voluntary units respectively. 10   In relation to output, the 
nursing homes in our sample on average produced 54,588 total patient days, with a minimum 
of 16,200 days for private homes and about 7920 days for public nursing homes. The 
maximum output is 165,900 patient days for public nursing homes. 
 
Table 4 Summary Statistics for Output and Inputs 
 Variable No. Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 Output (total patient days)      
   Public 39 51,959 38,771 7920   165,900 
   Private 73 55,991 29,308 16,200   148,800 
   All Homes 112 54,588 32,795 7920   165,900 
 Primary Labour (medical staff)      
   Public 39 15.15 16.74 1 82 
   Private 73 9.33 5.82 1 30 
   All Homes 112 11.34 11.21 1 82 
 Secondary Labour (non-medical staff)      
   Public 38 19.92 13.56 3 61 
   Private 72 18.86 10.49 2 50 
   All Homes 110 19.92 11.59 2 61 
 Capital Input (number of beds)      
   Public 39 58.59 40.37 18 175 
   Private 73 56.03 24.43 22 128 
   All Homes 112 56.92 30.76 18 175 
 
With regard to labour inputs, whereas 16 nurses are employed on average in the 
public nursing homes, only 9 nurses are employed in the private homes.  Hence, the average 
number of medical staff employed in the public nursing home sector is almost twice the 
                                                          
10 The final number of observations reported in Table 4 is lower than reported earlier (see Table 2) due to 
missing observations for medical staff, and for some efficiency determining variables (see Table 5 below). 
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number of nurses employed in the private-voluntary facilities.  Moreover, the finding, that 
public units employ more medical staff, holds, regardless of the size of the unit.  When we 
split our sample of nursing homes into three different size categories, the number of nurses in 
public homes with 50-100 beds and 100+ beds is double that for equivalently-sized private-
voluntary units.  On the other hand, there is almost no difference between private and public 
nursing homes in the mean number of non-medical staff employed.  We note further that, on 
average, the number of nurses is broadly similar to the number of health care attendants for 
public long-stay units.  In contrast, the ratio of medical to non-medical personnel in private-
voluntary homes is approximately 1:2.  This ratio suggests that substitution may be occurring 
between medical and non-medical staff in private units, and consequently, this could have an 
effect on their technical efficiency levels.  As for the capital input, the average number of 
beds provided in all nursing homes is 58, and the number is slightly higher for public homes 
on average. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the efficiency determinants described in 
section 5.3.  As nearly all of these factors are dummy variables, only their means 
(percentages) are presented.  Additionally, we provide a breakdown for public and private 
nursing homes.  As can be seen, 65% of all nursing homes are private units.  Also, the 
facilities in our sample are equally distributed between the Dublin area and other regions, but 
there is a higher percentage of private nursing homes (58%) located in Dublin relative to 
public units (40%).  Interestingly, 75% of the public long-term care residential facilities in 
our sample have at least one nurse with a specialization in the care of the elderly (a diploma 
in gerontology), compared to 25% of the private-voluntary homes.  In relation to the size of 
the nursing home units, whereas 48.2% of all facilities have less than 50 beds, this percentage 
is higher for public homes (56%) than for private units (44%), thus indicating that if size is a 
relevant variable, the greater scale inefficiencies will occur in public units.  Furthermore, only 
15% of public, and 10% of private-voluntary nursing homes belong to the largest size 
category (≥ 100 beds).  Regarding our case-mix variable, the percentage of residents aged ≥ 
85 years is similar, on average, for public and private long-stay units – 30% for public, and 
26% for private facilities. 
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics for Efficiency Determinants (in %) 
Note: *Denotes the reference category. 
 
  
 Public Private All homes 
Variable and description 
No.  
Obs. 
Share 
No.  
Obs. 
Share 
No.  
Obs. 
Share 
  Ownership (=1 if private, = 0 if public)  n/a n/a n/a n/a 112 65.18 
  Location (=1 if Dublin area and 0 otherwise)  39 38.46 73 57.53 112 50.89 
Qualification (=1 if a nurse has diploma in   
gerontology)   
39 74.36 73 24.66 112 41.96 
  Size_1  (0 - 49 beds)* 39 56.41 73 43.84 112 48.21 
  Size_2  (50 - 99 beds) 39 28.21 73 46.57 112 40.18 
  Size_3  (≥ 100 beds) 39 15.38 73 9.59 112 11.61 
  Case-mix   39 29.91 73 26.19 112 27.48 
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Conventional DEA results 
Table 6 summarises the results of our estimated TE and SE scores for nursing homes in 
Ireland for both the CRS and VRS DEA technologies.11  The results are obtained for three 
alternative model specifications which differ in their inclusion of labour inputs (see also 
Table 3).  The CRS DEA model implicitly assumes that nursing homes are scale-efficient.  
However, as discussed earlier, nursing homes may be operating at sub-optimal scales.  Where 
scale inefficiencies are present, the CRS TE scores will underestimate the ‘true’ VRS DEA 
TE scores.  This is confirmed by the estimates in Table 6 where the VRS TE scores are, on 
average, higher than for the CRS approach.  Thus, our findings show that scale inefficiencies 
are present in the Irish nursing home sector, similar to the results obtained for nursing homes 
studies in other countries (e.g. see Kooreman, 1994; Chattopadhyay and Ray, 1996). 
 
Table 6 Summary Statistics for DEA Efficiency Scores for Public and Private 
Nursing Homes 
 
Focusing on the estimates of the VRS DEA model, the mean TE scores for all nursing 
homes for Models 1, 2 and 3 are 0.62, 0.59 and 0.62 respectively.  These scores appear low 
when compared, for example, to the studies by Bjorkgren et al. (2001) and Laine et al. (2005) 
who found mean TE estimates of around 0.85 and 0.72 respectively, for long-term care 
residential units in Finland.  While the output variable used in these studies is adjusted by 
case-mix, the results nevertheless provide a useful benchmark against which to assess the 
productive efficiency performance of Irish nursing homes.  Similarly, Borge and Hardaldsvik 
(2009) reported a mean input-oriented DEA technical efficiency estimate of 0.84 for 
Norwegian nursing homes, where their output variable is measured using the total number of 
residents.  This finding is in line with an earlier Norwegian study by Kalseth (2003).  Beyond 
the Scandinavian countries, Nyman and Bricker (1989) obtained an average TE estimate of 
                                                          
11 The total number of observations for Models 2 and 3 is further reduced to 110, as there are two observations 
missing for the number of medical staff. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 No. 
Obs. 
Mean St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
Mean St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
Mean St. Dev. 
CRS TE 
Public 39 0.498 0.180 38 0.479 0.178 38 0.497 0.181 
Private 73 0.578 0.224 72 0.549 0.209 72 0.577 0.223 
All homes 112 0.550 0.212 110 0.525 0.201 110 0.549 0.212 
VRS TE 
Public 39 0.606 0.194 38 0.585 0.195 38 0.618 0.197 
Private 73 0.623 0.198 72 0.598 0.195 72 0.627 0.200 
All homes 112 0.617 0.196 110 0.594 0.194 110 0.624 0.198 
Scale efficiency (SE) 
Public 39 0.828 0.185 38 0.827 0.182 38 0.810 0.186 
Private 73 0.913 0.162 72 0.905 0.154 72 0.906 0.168 
All homes 112 0.883 0.175 110 0.878 0.168 110 0.873 0.180 
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0.89 for Wisconsin nursing homes in the USA.  Furthermore, in relation to the efficiency 
scores for private and public facilities, Irish nursing homes again appear to perform poorly 
compared to previous studies.  For example, in Model 1, the mean TE scores for the Irish 
public and private long-stay units in our sample are 0.61 and 0.62 respectively.  In contrast, 
Chattopadhyay and Heffley (1994) obtained average TE estimates of 0.71 and 0.92 
respectively, for non-profit and for-profit facilities in Connecticut.  Similarly Ozcan et al. 
(1998) found mean productive efficiency scores of 0.80 for non-profit homes, and 0.84 in for-
profit units in skilled nursing facilities in the USA. 
The average scale efficiencies are also presented in Table 6.  For Models 1 and 3, the 
mean SE for all nursing homes is about 0.88.  As the scale efficiency is on average higher 
than the technical efficiency, this implies that the total inefficiency of the nursing homes is 
driven to a greater extent by pure technical inefficiency rather than as a result of scale 
inefficiency. 
Furthermore, comparing the VRS DEA results for the three alternative model 
specifications in Table 6 provides insights into the impact of the different labour inputs on the 
technical efficiency of Irish nursing homes.  We find that when TE is estimated using non-
medical staff only (Model 2), the mean TE score is slightly lower than the scores obtained for 
Models 1 and 3 where the input of medical staff is taken into account.  Moreover, the results 
for Models 1 and 3 are very similar.  Overall, this implies that employing more nurses leads 
to more efficient outcomes. 
Importantly, comparing the mean VRS TE and SE scores in Table 6, private nursing 
homes are on average more technically and more scale efficient than public nursing homes.  
However, there is no statistically significant difference in the mean TE scores between the 
two ownership types based on the mean-comparison (one tailed) t-test and the Mann-Whitney 
test (see appendix Table A.2).  The null hypothesis, that the mean TE scores for public and 
private nursing homes are the same, is not rejected in the case of all three models for VRS 
technology.  In contrast, the SE scores are significantly higher for private nursing homes 
compared to public homes for all three model specifications. 
While no statistical difference in the mean VRS TE scores between public and private 
units was found, there are important differences in the distribution of TE scores between the 
two groups of nursing homes.  Table 7 presents the percentage distribution of TE and SE 
scores partitioned into public and private nursing home sectors.  Fifty-two percent of private 
units (in Model 1) display TE scores which are below 0.60 indicating that they could reduce 
their inputs usage by up to 40% for the same level of patient days.  In comparison, 56% of 
public nursing homes have TE scores lower than 0.60.  However, while 13% of public homes 
are fully technically efficient, only 7% of private facilities are found to have a technical 
efficiency score equal to 1.  On the other hand, a large majority of private nursing homes 
(74%) display SE scores between 0.90 and 0.99, compared to only 51% of public units. 
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Table 7  Frequency Distribution of Efficiency (VRS DEA) by 
Ownership 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Range  private public private public private public 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Technical efficiency 
1.00 5 7 5 13 4 6 4 11 6 8 5 13 
0.90-0.99 5 7 0 0 3 4 0 0 4 6 0 0 
0.80-0.89 4 5 1 3 5 7 1 3 4 6 1 3 
0.70-0.79 8 11 4 10 8 11 4 11 8 11 5 13 
0.60-0.69 13 18 7 18 11 15 6 16 13 18 5 13 
Below 0.60 38 52 22 56 41 57 23 61 37 51 22 58 
Total 73 100 39 100 72 100 38 100 72 100 38 100 
Scale efficiency 
1.00 3 4 1 3 1 1 1 3 4 6 1 3 
0.90-0.99 54 74 20 51 57 79 20 53 50 69 16 42 
0.80-0.89 5 7 4 10 4 6 3 8 7 10 5 13 
0.70-0.79 2 3 2 5 2 3 5 13 2 3 4 11 
0.60-0.69 3 4 7 18 2 3 5 13 3 4 7 18 
Below 0.60 6 8 5 13 6 8 4 11 6 8 5 13 
Total 73 100 39 100 72 100 38 100 72 100 38 100 
 
We also compare the TE scores obtained for the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) 
and VRS DEA models in order to identify whether those nursing homes which are scale-
inefficient produce at increasing or decreasing returns to scale.  Those nursing homes which 
are both technically and scale efficient are operating at optimal scale.  All other units are 
operating at either increasing or decreasing returns to scale.  As we can see from Table 8, 
91% of all homes exhibit increasing returns to scale, and hence should increase their 
operations (all inputs) to become scale efficient.  The results are very similar for Models 2 
and 3. 
 
Table 8  Public and Private Nursing Homes that Exhibit Sub-Optimal Scales in Model 1 
 All homes Public Private 
 No. % No. % No. % 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 4 4 1 3 3 4 
Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) 103 91 36 92 67 92 
Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) 5 5 2 5 3 4 
Total 112 100 39 100 73 100 
 
6.2. Homogenous bootstrap DEA results 
Table 9 presents the homogenous bootstrap DEA mean efficiency scores and sample 
confidence intervals for Model 1, together with the average scores obtained using the 
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conventional DEA method (see also Table 6). 12   Any bias in the conventional DEA 
efficiencies is reflected in the difference between these scores and the bootstrap DEA 
efficiency scores.  We can see that our DEA mean TE estimates for Irish nursing homes 
exceed the mean bootstrap bias-corrected efficiencies, thus indicating a positive bias. 
Furthermore, both the conventional DEA TE and SE scores are consistently above the 
bootstrap upper bounds, and outside the confidence interval. This result implies that our 
conventional DEA CRS and VRS efficiencies are over-estimates of the true efficiency scores, 
and that the bias is significant.  Hence, the inefficiencies which we observe in Irish nursing 
homes underplay the true picture.  Focusing on the estimates for the VRS DEA model, the 
mean bootstrap bias-corrected TE score for all nursing homes for Model 1 is 0.56. 13  
Additionally, the relativities in terms of the proportionality between the conventional DEA 
mean efficiencies and the homogenous bootstrap (bias-adjusted) mean efficiencies remain the 
same across the CRS and VRS DEA models.  Expressing the bootstrap CRS TE as a ratio of 
the bootstrap VRS TE gives the estimates of the bootstrap bias-corrected SE scores in Table 
9, and our original findings regarding the existence of scale inefficiencies (presented in Table 
6) are still valid. 
 
Table 9  Homogenous Bootstrap DEA Efficiency Scores and Sample Confidence 
Intervals for Model 1 
* denotes conventional DEA efficiency estimate is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, 
i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score. 
 
In terms of the statistical difference in the means of the bootstrapped bias-corrected TE 
and SE scores between private and public nursing units, the results confirm our earlier 
findings and are available on request.  While the private nursing homes are significantly more 
scale efficient on average than the public units, there is no statistically significant difference 
in the means of the VRS bias-corrected TE scores between the two ownership groups.  Also, 
                                                          
12 The estimations were performed using the FEAR software package (see e.g. Wilson, 2008).  As the results 
obtained for Models 2 and 3, using the bootstrap procedure, are very similar to those provided for Model 1, they 
are not presented but are available on request. 
13 The bias-corrected efficiency scores for Models 2 and 3 are 0.53 and 0.55 respectively. 
 DEA Homogenous bootstrap DEA 
 Mean score Mean score Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CRS TE 
Public   0.498* 0.446 0.407 0.488 
Private    0.578* 0.522 0.475 0.568 
All homes   0.550* 0.496 0.451 0.541 
VRS TE 
Public   0.606* 0.541 0.494 0.596 
Private    0.623* 0.562 0.515 0.613 
All homes   0.617* 0.555 0.507 0.607 
Scale efficiency (SE) 
Public   0.828* 0.827 0.823 0.825 
Private    0.913* 0.913 0.907 0.912 
All homes   0.883* 0.883 0.878 0.882 
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in relation to the frequency distribution for the bootstrap bias-adjusted TE and SE scores, we 
find a very similar pattern to that presented for the conventional DEA efficiency scores in 
Table 6. 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the original conventional DEA TE scores and the 
distribution of the bias-corrected DEA TE scores using the homogenous bootstrap method, 
for Model 1, for both CRS and VRS technologies.  It is apparent that the kernel density 
functions do not differ a lot with regard to the estimation method (i.e. conventional DEA 
versus the bootstrap method).  However, as found earlier, we can see some differences in the 
distribution of the CRS versus the VRS TE scores for both the conventional DEA and 
bootstrap methods.  Whereas the means of the two distributions are very similar, the variance 
in the CRS model is considerably wider than in the VRS model, indicating possible 
discrepancies in technical efficiencies due to scale inefficiencies. 
 
Figure 3  Kernel Density Functions for both Conventional DEA and Homogenous Bootstrap 
Bias-Corrected DEA TE Scores 
  
 
6.3 Double bootstrap DEA results 
Table 10 presents the estimated parameters of the efficiency determinants obtained using the 
double-bootstrap DEA method.  The estimations were performed for both CRS and VRS 
technologies and for all three models.14  We focus here on the CRS results in particular as this 
technology is commonly used in two-stage analyses in the wider efficiency measurement 
literature, mainly for two reasons.  First, the CRS TE scores provide a measure of the overall 
efficiency of each nursing home unit, i.e. aggregating pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency, while the VRS approach only measures pure technical efficiency as discussed 
earlier.  Second, the CRS TE scores exhibit more variability compared to the VRS measure, 
and this is supported in our case in Figure 3. 
The results in Table 10 present strong statistical evidence in relation to the impact of 
ownership on the technical efficiencies of Irish nursing homes.  For all three models, the 
ownership parameter coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level using 
CRS technology, and at the 5% or 10% level when VRS is applied – implying that private 
                                                          
14  The estimations for the double bootstrap DEA were performed using the rDEA package within the R 
platform. 
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homes are less technically efficient than the public units.  This result is at variance with much 
of the previous long-term care literature where private or for-profit facilities are found to be 
more efficient than non-profit units, when allowed to face the same production frontier (see 
section 5.3 for discussion, and e.g. Nyman and Bricker 1989; Nyman et al. 1990; Fizel and 
Nunnikhoven, 1992; Chattopadhyay and Heffley 1994; and Ozcan et al. 1998).  We argue 
that the effective State subsidy for the provision of contract beds can lead to less efficient 
outcomes for the private Irish nursing homes analysed in this study.  Also, the Irish 
Government policy of introducing capital allowances to stimulate private delivery could have 
led to the self-selection of “inefficient” facilities into the private nursing home sector in 
Ireland.  Finally, Irish private nursing homes hire on average less nurses than the public units.  
Due to the substitution of non-medical for medical staff in private nursing homes, private 
facilities may be less efficient than public homes.  Employing less nurses relative to health-
care attendants can lead to lower average TE scores. 
We find mixed results for the location variable as a determinant of technical efficiency.  
Location has a positive and statistically significant effect on the TE scores under CRS 
technology, indicating differences in technical efficiency between nursing homes in the 
Dublin area and those in other regions in Ireland.  However, we do not find any significant 
effect of this variable for the VRS measure.  In addition, for all models assuming CRS 
technology, and for Model 1 under VRS, we find evidence of a statistically significant and 
negative impact of the qualification variable on the TE scores for our sample of Irish long-
stay units.  Hence, as discussed in section 5.3, and similar to Nyman and Bricker (1989), 
Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), Kooreman (1994), and Laine et al. (2005), we find that a 
tendency towards quality improvements can lead to lower technical efficiency. 
Surprisingly, in contrast to other studies, the case-mix variable is not found to be 
statistically significant for most model specifications and is only weakly significant for CRS 
technology in Model 1.  This result may be due to the low variability in the case-mix variable 
shown in Table 5.  Regarding the size variable, nursing home units with a larger number of 
beds are significantly more technically efficient than the nursing homes with less than 50 
beds.  A similar effect was observed by Nyman et al. (1990).  This result corroborates our 
earlier findings that Irish nursing homes are scale-inefficient and most of them produce on the 
IRS part of the production frontier.  Thus, in order to be fully productive (both technically 
and scale efficient), they should increase their size (i.e. scale of operations). 
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Table 10  Estimates of TE Determinants using Double Bootstrap DEA Method 
*** significant at the 1%  level, ** significant at the 5%  level, and * significant at the 10%  level. 
 
Table 11 presents the double bootstrap bias-corrected efficiency scores and the corresponding 
95% confidence intervals.  The bias-corrected efficiency scores are adjusted for the effects of 
the efficiency determinants.  Also, the conventional (non-bootstrap) DEA efficiency 
estimates are given in the first column of the table.  The double bootstrap results confirm 
again that the nursing home units in this study are on average technically inefficient for both 
CRS and VRS technologies.  Moreover, the conventional TE scores are upward biased when 
compared with the double bootstrap bias-corrected TE scores, indicating overestimates of the 
true mean efficiency values.  Hence, similar to the homogenous bootstrap DEA results (in 
Table 9), the nursing homes in our sample are even more inefficient than was found using the 
conventional DEA method.  Furthermore, the bias is significant at the 5% level for the VRS 
TE estimates – the conventional DEA mean VRS TE estimates are outside the bootstrap 
 CRS TE VRS TE 
 
Estimated 
coefficient  
Lower 
Bound  
Upper 
bound 
Estimated 
coefficient  
Lower 
Bound  
Upper 
bound 
Model 1  
Constant -34.02*** -77.33 -19.53    1.647*** 1.128 2.054 
Ownership (1=private)  -14.86*** -35.17 -8.558 -0.317** -0.592 -0.042 
Location (1=Dublin)  6.874** 1.025 19.06    -0.024 -0.332 0.290 
Qualification -8.479*** -22.48 -2.774 -0.305** -0.616 -0.029 
Size_2  (50 - 100 beds)  15.12*** 7.723 34.233    0.857*** 0.540 1.171 
Size_3  (> 100 beds)       2.381 -17.44 20.191    0.988*** 0.533 1.441 
Case mix       0.199* 0.022 0.439     0.006 -0.008 0.016 
No. observations       112         112   
Model 2  
Constant -32.65*** -76.24 -18.89      1.837*** 1.185 2.514 
Ownership (1=private)  -12.22*** -33.99 -3.912  -0.296* -0.542 -0.021 
Location (1=Dublin)  6.491** 1.321 16.696 -0.016 -0.275 0.258 
Qualification -6.934** -19.78 -0.935 -0.169 -0.502 0.158 
Size_2  (50 - 100 beds)    12.65*** 5.535 23.502      0.876***  0.457 1.256 
Size_3  (> 100 beds)        3.713 -24.53 16.077      0.887***  0.423 1.284 
Case mix   0.219* 0.021 0.466 -0.001 -0.014 0.011 
No. observations      110         110   
Model 3  
Constant -33.99*** -69.75 -19.49 1.671*** 1.139 2.136 
Ownership (1=private)  -13.33*** -32.71 -5.965   -0.288* -0.547 -0.049 
Location (1=Dublin)     5.582** 0.305 14.60   -0.025 -0.306 0.285 
Qualification   -7.250 -26.60 1.841   -0.254 -0.569 0.139 
Size_2  (50 - 100 beds)  13.60*** 3.899 27.66 0.873***  0.488 1.167 
Size_3  (> 100 beds)      5.205 -12.32 27.24 1.004***  0.610 1.426 
Case mix      0.247 -0.102 0.816    0.004 -0.009 0.016 
No. observations     110       110   
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upper bounds, which implies that they are significantly different from the bias-corrected VRS 
TE scores. 
The main difference between these results and the efficiency scores presented earlier 
for the conventional DEA (Table 6) and the homogenous bootstrap DEA (Table 9) methods is 
that the CRS and VRS TE scores are very similar on average.  Accordingly, the mean (bias-
corrected) SE scores obtained for the double bootstrap DEA model are very close to 1, 
indicating that the nursing home units are almost fully scale efficient.  This is at variance with 
our earlier results where the VRS TE scores were greater than the CRS scores, and scale 
inefficiencies were apparent.  Also, given that the nursing homes are almost fully scale 
efficient, the (low) mean CRS TE score observed for the double-bootstrap model is due to 
pure technical inefficiency only and not scale inefficiency.  We find that the conventional 
DEA scale efficiencies are downward biased relative to the double bootstrap bias-corrected 
SE scores (indicating underestimates of the true mean SE values), and the bias is significant 
at the 5% level (i.e. the conventional DEA mean SE estimates are outside the bootstrap lower 
bounds).  This result is unsurprising as the double bootstrap model adjusts the observed CRS 
and VRS TE scores for the effects of size and other determinants, to give bias-corrected TE 
scores.  We already saw, in Table 10, a statistically strong determining effect for the ‘size’ 
variable.  Hence, controlling directly for the determinants of efficiency in the double-
bootstrap model, and in particular adjusting for the size of the facilities, the nursing homes 
become scale efficient.  This result is also in line with our earlier findings where we observe 
that Irish nursing homes should increase their size to take advantage of economies of scale. 
 
Table 11  Double Bootstrap DEA Efficiency Scores for Model 1 
* denotes conventional DEA efficiency estimate is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, 
i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This research contributes to the literature on efficiency in the long-stay care sector by 
providing methodological and empirical insights into the estimation of technical efficiency.  
Using a rich primary data set and applying robust estimation methods, the paper delivers 
relevant and interesting findings from the first investigation of the technical and scale 
 DEA Two-stage double bootstrap DEA 
 Mean score Mean score Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CRS TE 
Public  0.498 0.475 0.457 0.511 
Private   0.578 0.553 0.534 0.598 
All homes  0.550 0.526 0.507 0.568 
VRS TE 
Public   0.606* 0.522 0.474 0.586 
Private   0.623* 0.549 0.499 0.621 
All homes  0.617* 0.539 0.490 0.609 
Scale efficiency (SE) 
Public 0.828* 0.914 0.874 0.971 
Private  0.913* 0.995 0.948 1.058 
All homes 0.883* 0.966 0.922 1.028 
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efficiency levels and the impact of efficiency determinants for public and private nursing 
homes in Ireland. 
Across all Irish nursing homes we found considerable technical inefficiencies.  Based 
on our conventional VRS DEA model where the number of nurses is used as the only labour 
input (Model 1), the estimated average TE score is 0.62 for all nursing homes, with only 7% 
of all private and 13% of all public units being fully technically efficient.  This result 
indicates that nursing homes in Ireland should on average decrease their level of inputs by 
38% in order to produce efficiently.  We also find that the number of medical staff is the most 
important labour input since the TE scores estimated using the number of nurses as the only 
labour input (Model 1) are higher than those obtained when using the number of health care 
attendants only (Model 2). 
Moreover, the bootstrap DEA results suggest that the conventional DEA TE scores are 
overestimated.  The bias-corrected VRS mean TE scores, for all nursing homes in Model 1, 
are very similar when we compare the homogenous and double bootstrap results, with values 
of 0.56 and 0.54 respectively.  These scores are around 10% lower than the score obtained 
using the conventional DEA method.  The overestimates of the true DEA TE scores imply 
that Irish nursing homes are even more inefficient than the conventional DEA findings would 
suggest. 
Regarding scale efficiency, in the conventional DEA and the homogenous bootstrap 
DEA models, the CRS TE scores are lower on average than the scores obtained using VRS 
technology, indicating that scale inefficiencies exist in the nursing home sector in Ireland.  
The estimated average SE score is 0.88 for all nursing homes in Model 1, which is higher 
than the VRS mean TE score.  Furthermore, according to the conventional NIRS DEA 
frontier, the overwhelming majority of facilities produce on the increasing returns to scale 
part of the production frontier, indicating the existence of economies of scale. This implies 
that Irish nursing homes are not operating in the economically feasible region as they could 
still decrease their average costs and move to the point of minimum marginal costs by 
extending their scale of production.  Additionally, only 4% of all nursing homes are fully 
productive (both technically and scale efficient) and operating at optimal scale. 
Moreover, focusing further on the double bootstrap DEA results, the most striking 
feature is the very high average scale efficiency scores obtained – 0.97 for all nursing homes 
and equal to unity for private homes.  However, this result is in line with our other findings.  
Based on our conventional DEA estimates, Irish nursing homes are scale inefficient and they 
produce at increasing returns to scale.  Crucially, the double bootstrap model integrates the 
effects of explanatory variables in estimating the true efficiencies.  Controlling directly for 
the determinants of efficiency in the double bootstrap model, and in particular adjusting for 
the size of the facilities, the nursing homes become scale efficient. 
Turning our attention to the results from the estimation of the efficiency determinants, 
the size variable has a strongly significant and positive effect on technical efficiency 
(underlying our double bootstrap scale efficiency results).  This suggests that larger nursing 
homes could increase their technical efficiencies due to specialisation as indicated by Ozcan 
et al. (1998) and Filippini (1999).  Also, location is found to be statistically significant using 
CRS technology only and is not a significant factor when VRS is applied, implying again that 
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the scale economies could be better utilised in the Dublin area compared to other regions in 
Ireland. 
An important finding of this study is that ownership has a statistically significant and 
negative effect on the TE scores of Irish nursing home units, indicating that private facilities 
are less productively efficient than the public units.  As discussed earlier, this result is at odds 
with much of the previous literature.  Nonetheless, this finding might be explained in the Irish 
case by the structure of the nursing home sector where many private long-stay units are 
effectively subsidised by the State in the form of fixed contracts per bed, capital allowances 
(from 1998 until 2011), and the dominance of the NHSS/ Fair Deal funding mechanism.  
Interestingly, quality (as measured by employing at least one nurse with a formal 
qualification in the care of the elderly) negatively affects the technical efficiency of nursing 
homes.  Similar to other studies (e.g. Fizel and Nunnikhoven, 1992; and Laine et al., 2005), 
increasing quality may require additional labour and capital resources – hence, homes 
providing higher quality of care may have lower efficiency scores. 
Another novelty of this article was the inclusion of a case-mix indicator directly in the 
double-bootstrap setting to measure the technical efficiency of nursing homes.  We consider 
this to be a more robust approach than treating case-mix as an output or an input variable, or 
as an environmental variable in traditional two-stage procedures, as has been done in other 
studies.  However, we find little statistical evidence for the determining effect of our chosen 
case-mix variable, and a greater range of indicators in this area is probably required.  
Nonetheless, a complication here is that the case-mix profile is rather similar across the 
nursing homes in Ireland.  This is illustrated in our earlier descriptive statistics for the private 
and public nursing homes, respectively. 
The findings of this study inform policymakers that the majority of Irish nursing homes 
are not only technically inefficient but they should also increase their economies of scale by 
increasing their size.  Given that private-voluntary nursing homes, who supply care to the 
state on a fixed contract per bed basis, are less technically efficient than the public homes, our 
results suggest that public provision of long-term care in Ireland should be re-targeted rather 
than incentivising private delivery.  This is based on the following findings: the significant 
and negative private ownership effect, and the much higher ratio of nursing to non-medical 
staff in public units.  Alternatively, the government should introduce appropriate regulation 
for the nursing home sector which would promote the objective of efficiency in resource 
allocation.  In particular, the nursing home units in Ireland should be incentivised to increase 
their scale of operation in order to improve their technical efficiency and to produce at 
optimal scale. 
 
 
References 
Aaronson, W.E., Zinn, J.S. and Rosko, M,D. (1994) “Do for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes 
behave differently?”, The Gerontologist, 34 (6): 775-786. 
Aigner, D. J., Lovell, C. A. K., Schmidt, P. (1977). “Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier 
production functions”, Journal of Econometrics, 6(1): 21–37. 
29 
 
Anderson, R. L., Lewis, D., Webb, J. R. (1999). “The Efficiency of Nursing Home Chains and the 
Implications of Non-profit Status”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 5(3): 235-
245. 
Banker, R. D., Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W. (1984). “Some models for estimating technical and scale 
inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis”, Management Science, 30(9): 1078-1092. 
BDO (2014). Health’s ageing crisis: time for action - a future strategy for Ireland’s long-term 
residential care sector. BDO Report. http://www.nhi.ie/?p=publications_BDO_report. Accessed 
18 Oct 2016 
Björkgren, M. A., Häkkinen, U., Linna M. (2001). “Measuring efficiency of long-term care units in 
Finland”, Health Care Management Science, 4(3): 193-200. 
Blegen, M.A., Goode, C.J., Reed, L. (1998).  “Nurse staffing and patient outcomes”, Nursing 
Research, 47(1): 43-50. 
Borge, L-E., Haraldsvik, M. (2009). “Efficiency potential and determinants of efficiency: an analysis 
of the care for the elderly sector in Norway”, International Tax and Public Finance, 16(4): 468-
486. 
Canniffe, M (1999) One answer to age-old problem, The Irish Times, 24th September 1999. 
(http://www.irishtimes.com/business/one-answer-to-age-old-problem-1.231138, accessed 19 
October 2016) 
Central Statistics Office (2013) Population and labour force projections 2016–2046. CSO, Dublin. 
Chang, S. J., Cheng, M. A. (2013). “The impact of nursing quality on nursing home efficiency: 
evidence from Taiwan”, Review of Accounting and Finance, 12(4): 369-386. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, E. and Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. 
European Journal of Operational Research 2(6): 429 - 444. 
Chattopadhyay, S., Heffley, D. (1994). “Are for-profit nursing homes more efficient? Data 
envelopment analysis with a case-mix constraint”, Eastern Economic Journal, 20(2): 171-186. 
Chattopadhyay, S., Ray, S. C. (1996). “Technical, scale and size efficiency in nursing home care: a 
non-parametric analysis of Connecticut homes”, Health Economics, 5(4): 363-373. 
Crivelli, L., Filippini, M., Lunati, D. (2002). "Regulation, ownership and efficiency in the Swiss 
nursing home industry", International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2(2): 
79-97. 
Central Statistics Office (2013).  Population and labour force projections 2016-2046, CSO, Dublin. 
Delellis, N.O., Ozcan, Y.A. (2013).  “Quality outcomes among efficient and inefficient nursing 
homes: A national study”, Health Care Management Review, 38(2): 156-165. 
DG ECFIN (2012). The 2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 
Member States 2010-2060, Joint Report prepared by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) 
and the Economic Policy Committee (AWG), European Union. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Logan, J., (1983) “The relative efficiency of Illinois electric utilities”, 
Resources and Energy, 5 (4): 349-367. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Logan, J., (1985) “The relative performance of publicly-owned and privately-
owned electric utilities”, Journal of Public Economics, 26(1): 89-106. 
Farrell, M. (1957). “The measurement of productive efficiency”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, 120A(3): 253-281. 
Farsi, M., Filippini, M., Lunati, D. (2008). “Economies of scale and efficiency measurement in 
Switzerland’s nursing homes”, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 144(3): 359-378. 
Filippini, M. (1999). “Economies of scale in the Swiss nursing home industry”, Working Paper 
(https://ideas.repec.org/p/soz/wpaper/9901.html, accessed 30 June 2016) 
Fizel, J. L., Nunnikhoven, T. S. (1992). “Technical efficiency of for-profit and non-profit nursing 
homes”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 13(5): 429-439. 
Fizel, J.L. and Nunnikhoven, T.S.  (1993) “The efficiency of nursing home chains”, Applied 
Economics, 25(1): 49-55. 
Garavaglia, G., Lettieri, E., Agasisti, T., Lopez, S. (2011). “Efficiency and quality of care in nursing 
homes: an Italian case study”, Health Care Management Science, 14(1): 22-35. 
30 
 
Gertler, P. Waldman, D (1994). Why are not-for-profit nursing homes more costly, RAND 
Corporation. 
Harrington, C., Olney, B., Carrillo, H., Kang, T. (2012). “Nurse staffing and deficiencies in the largest 
for-profit nursing home chains and chains owned by private equity companies”, Health 
Services Research, 47: 106-28. 
Hoffler, R. A., Rungeling, B. (1984). “US nursing homes: Are they cost efficient?”, Economics Letter, 
44(3): 301 – 305. 
Hollingsworth, B. (2003). “Non-parametric and parametric applications measuring efficiency in 
health care”, Health Care Management Science, 6(4): 203-218. 
Hollingsworth, B. (2008). “The measurement of efficiency and productivity of health care delivery”, 
Health Economics, 17(10): 1107-1128. 
Hollingsworth, B., Peacock, S. J. (2008). Efficiency measurement in health and health care, 
Routledge. 
Iparraguirre, J.L., Ma, R. (2015).  “Efficiency in the provision of social care for older people.  A 
three-stage data envelopment analysis using self-reported quality of life”, Socio-Economic 
Planning Sciences, 49(1): 33-46. 
Kalseth, J. (2003). Political determinants of efficiency variation in municipal service production: an 
analysis of long-term care in Norway, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. 
Kleinsorge, I.K., Karney, D.F. (1992). “Management of nursing homes using data envelopment 
analysis”, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 26(1): 57-71. 
Knox, K.J., Blankmeyer, E.C., Stutzman, J.R. (2007).  “Technical efficiency in Texas nursing 
facilities: A stochastic production frontier approach”, Journal of Economics and Finance, 
31(1): 75-86. 
Kooreman, P. (1994). “Nursing home care in the Netherlands: a nonparametric efficiency analysis”, 
Journal of Health Economics, 13(3): 301-316. 
Laine, J., Finne-Soveri, U., Björkgren, M., Linna, M. Noro A., Häkkinen, U. (2005). “The association 
between quality of care and technical efficiency in long-term care", International Journal for 
Quality in Health Care, 17(3): 259-267. 
Nyman, J. A., Bricker, D. L. (1989). “Profit incentives and technical efficiency in the production of 
nursing home care”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(4): 586-594. 
Nyman, J. A., Bricker, D. L., Link, D. (1990). “Technical efficiency in nursing homes”, Medical 
Care, 28(6): 541-551. 
Ozcan, Y.A. Wogen, S.E., Mau, Li W. (1998). “Efficiency Evaluation of Skilled Nursing Facilities”, 
Journal of Medical Systems, 22(4): 211-224. 
Rosko, M.D., Chilingerian, J.A., Zinn, J. S., Aaronson, W.E. (1995). “The effects of ownership, 
operating environment, and strategic choices on nursing-home efficiency”, Medical Care, 
33(10): 1001-1021. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P. W. (1998). “Sensitivity analysis of efficiency scores: How to bootstrap in 
nonparametric frontier models”, Management Science, 44(1): 49-61. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P. W. (2000). “Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models: The state of 
the art”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13(1): 49-78. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P. W. (2007). “Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models of 
productive efficiency”, Journal of Econometrics, 136(1): 31–64. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P. W. (2011). “Two-stage DEA: caveat emptor”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
36(2): 205-218. 
Vitaliano, D.F., Toren, M. (1994).  “Cost and Efficiency in Nursing Homes: a Stochastic Frontier 
Approach”, Journal of Health Economics, 13(3): 281-300. 
Wang, Y. H., Chou, L. F. (2005). “The efficiency of nursing homes in Taiwan: An empirical study 
using data envelopment analysis”, Management Review, 12(1): 167-194. 
Wilson, P. (2008). “FEAR: A software package for frontier efficiency analysis with R”, Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences, 42(4): 247-254. 
Worthington, C. (2004). “Frontier efficiency measurement in health care: A review of empirical 
techniques and selected applications”, Medical Care Research and Review, 61(2): 135-170. 
Zinn, J.S. (1993). “The influence of nurse wage differentials on nursing home staffing and resident 
care decisions”, Gerontologist, 33(6): 721-729.  
31 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1 Previous evaluations of efficiency in the nursing home sector 
Author(s) Technique 
Country and 
sample  
Output variable 
Average efficiency and other 
findings 
Anderson, 
Lewis and 
Webb (1999) 
Bayesian SFA 
(stochastic 
production 
frontier model).  
653 nursing homes, 
United States nation-
wide for the year 
1995. 
Number of patients 
admitted. 
For-profit homes have much higher 
mean efficiency scores than the non-
for-profit homes, with TE scores of 
0.90 and 0.73, respectively. 
Björkgren, 
Häkkinen and 
Linna (2001) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – input-
oriented TE, SE, 
AE and CE. 
  
64 nursing homes in 
Finland collected for 
the year 1995. 
Case-mix adjusted 
patient days. 
The mean CE was 0.77 for model 1 
and 0.74 for model 2.  The means of 
the TE scores were 0.85 and 0.87 and 
the means of AE were 0.86 and 0.89.  
Larger units operated more efficiently 
than smaller units. 
Borge and 
Haraldsvik, 
(2009) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – input- and 
output-oriented 
TE; double 
bootstrap model. 
Each local 
government area and 
the national level 
efficiency potential. 
Number of patients 
by service. 
The mean TE score is 0.84 (for input-
orientation) and 0.85 (for output-
orientation). 
Chang and 
Cheng (2013) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – 
input-oriented TE 
132 nursing homes in 
Taiwan during 2004-
2009. 
Number of 
residents; Number 
of falls; Number of 
times the resident 
uses emergency 
services. 
The average TE is 0.90. 
Chattopadhyay 
and Heffley 
(1994) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – 
input - oriented 
TE. 
140 nursing homes 
from Connecticut, 
USA during the year 
1982-83 
Total patient days. The mean efficiency score for non-
profit homes is 0.71 compared to 0.92 
for-profit homes. 
 
Chattopadhyay 
and Ray (1996) 
DEA  (CRS, VRS 
and NIRS) –
output-oriented 
TE 
140 nursing homes 
from 
Connecticut, USA 
during the year 1982-
83 
Total patient days. The mean level of TE was 0.80 for 
non-profit homes and 0.94 for-profit 
homes.  The mean levels of scale 
efficiency are 0.96 for no-profit 
homes and 0.97 for those operating 
for profit. 
Crivelli, 
Filippini, and 
Lunati (2002) 
SFA (cost 
frontier) – CE and 
SE. 
Cross Sectional Data 
of 886 nursing homes. 
Data given by the 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical office and 
its’ for the period 
1998. 
Total patient days. The mean CE was 0.79 (or 0.21 for 
cost inefficiency) 
DeLellis and 
Ozcan (2013) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – 
input-oriented TE 
10% of random 
sample of U.S. 
nursing homes 
Number of 
medicare residents; 
Number of 
medicaid residents; 
Number of other 
residents. 
The average efficiency was 0.87, with 
a statistically significant higher 
average efficiency for nursing homes 
in urban areas; in counties with a 
higher level of competition, higher 
average income, or higher number of 
home health agencies, and in not-for-
profit and governmental facilities. 
Mostly favourable quality outcomes 
were found for efficient nursing 
homes. 
Farsi, Filippini, 
Lunati (2008) 
SFA (cost 
frontier) - CE 
356 nursing homes in 
Switzerland, 
operating over the 
period from 1998 to 
2002 
Total patient days. The mean CE for the final model used 
was 0.92 (or 0.081 for cost 
inefficiency). 
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Table A.1 continued 
Note: TE = technical efficiency, AE = allocative Efficiency, SE = scale efficiency, CE = cost efficiency. The table also draws 
partly on information presented in Iparraguirre and Ma (2015). The studies are presented in alphabetical order. 
Fizel and 
Nunnikhoven 
(1992) 
DEA (CRS – 
input-oriented 
TE) 
163 Michigan 
nursing homes in 
USA, of which 104 
are forprofit 
and 59 are non-
profit homes. 
Total patient 
days for skilled 
and intermediate-
care patients. 
Average efficiency 0.655.  Chain 
homes have higher average 
efficiency scores (0.705) relative 
to independent operators (0.622). 
Garavaglia,  
Lettieri, Agasisti 
and Lopez 
(2011) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS ), – input-
oriented TE; 
homogenous 
bootstrap model. 
40 Italian nursing 
homes   
(with six public and 
34 private 
facilities),  over a 3-
year period. 
Case-mix, extra 
nursing hours and 
out-of-pocket 
charges 
Mean TE scores is between 0.78 
and 85.  Quality of care is 
positively related to efficiency. 
Hoffler and 
Rungeling (1994) 
SFA (cost 
frontier) - CE 
1079 nursing homes 
in the U.S. for the 
year 1985. 
Skilled inpatient 
days; intermediate 
inpatient days and 
‘other’ inpatient 
days. 
For-profit homes have lower costs 
relative to non-profit homes. 
 
Kleinsorge and 
Karney (1992) 
DEA TE (output-
oriented) 
22 nursing homes in 
Kansas 
Total patient days; 
State inspection 
score; Decubiti-
free days care; 
operating income. 
The nursing homes are found to be 
fully efficient with a score of 1.0. 
Knox, 
Blankmeyer, 
Stutzman (2007) 
SFA (Cobb 
Douglas) 
Panel data of Texas 
nursing homes for 
1999 and 2002 
Number of Patient 
days. 
Average Efficiency Scores 0.80-
0.92. Non-profit facilities are 
notably less productive than 
facilities operated for profit. 
Kooreman (1994) DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – input-
oriented TE 
292 Dutch nursing 
homes. 
Number of patients 
by care needs. 
Average efficiency score 0.87 
Laine, Finne-
Soveri, 
Bjorkgren, Linna, 
Noro, Hakkinen 
(2005) 
DEA (CRS) – 
input-oriented TE   
114 public health 
centre hospitals and 
residential homes in 
Finland. 
Total inpatient 
days adjusted by 
case-mix. 
Mean TE 0.72. 
 Nyman and 
Bricker (1989); 
 Nyman, Bricker 
and Link 
(1990) 
DEA (CRS) – 
input-oriented TE 
195 nursing homes 
in Wisconsin (U.S.) 
for the year 1979. 
Patients by care 
needs. 
Average efficiency score was 0.89. 
For-profit nursing homes are 
significantly more efficient than 
the not for profit nursing homes. 
Ozcan, Wogen, 
and Mau (1998) 
DEA – input-
oriented TE. 
Uses a 10% national 
sample of 324 
skilled nursing 
facilities in the 
United States 
 
Total inpatient 
days of medicare 
and medicaid 
clients; Total 
private-pay 
inpatient days. 
The average efficiency of the for-
profits is 0.840 and for the non- 
profits is 0.803. For-profit and 
medium skilled nursing facilities 
are more efficient than non-profit 
and low-skilled units. 
Vitaliano and 
Toren (1994) 
SFA (cost 
frontier) - CE 
164 Skilled Nursing 
Facilities and 443 
combination skilled 
and health related 
facilities during 
1987 and 1990. 
Patient days. Average CE 71% 
No change in efficiency between 
1987 and 1990, and it does not 
vary between for-profit and not-for 
profit homes. 
Wang and Chou 
(2005) 
DEA (CRS and 
VRS) – input-
oriented TE 
53 Long Term Care 
Institutions in 
Taiwan. 
Number of 
residents; Number 
of quality outputs 
(e.g. accreditation 
of professional 
review committee; 
and accident rate) 
Average Efficiency VRS TE score 
of 0.77. 
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Table A.2  Mean comparison tests on the differences in DEA TE and SE between public 
and private nursing homes 
*** significant difference at the 1% level, ** significant difference at the 5% level, and * significant difference at the 
10% level. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Criterion 
value (z/t) 
(p value) 
Decision 
with 
respect H0 
Criterion 
value 
(p value) 
Decision 
with 
respect H0 
Criterion 
value 
(p value) 
Decision 
with 
respect 
H0 
CRS TE 
t-test 
Ho: TEpublic – TEprivate = 0 
-1.935** 
(0.028) 
reject -1.741* 
(0.042) 
reject -1.903** 
(0.030) 
reject 
Mann-Whitney test  
-2.000** 
(0.046) 
reject -1.861* 
(0.063) 
reject -1.983** 
(0.047) 
reject 
VRS TE 
t-test 
Ho: TEpublic – TEprivate = 0 
-0.439 
(0.331) 
accept -0.350 
(0.363) 
accept -0.237 
(0.406) 
accept 
Mann-Whitney test 
-0.437 
(0.662) 
accept -0.450 
(0.653) 
accept -0.261 
(0.794) 
accept 
Scale efficiency (SE) 
t-test 
Ho: SEpublic – SEprivate = 0 
-2.500*** 
(0.007) 
reject -2.366** 
(0.010) 
reject -2.755*** 
(0.003) 
reject 
Mann-Whitney test 
-3.988*** 
(0.000) 
reject -3.178*** 
(0.002) 
reject -3.916** 
(0.000) 
reject 
